

MACRO STRATEGY

Excess Savings and the Consumer

Key Takeaways

- Household income exceeded spending by a total of \$5.5 trillion during the pandemic, or 72% above what it might have been in normal times.
- Consumers have been spending, and they likely have sufficient savings to stave off a recession into 2023 despite Fed actions toward reducing demand.

How Much Excess Savings Do Consumers Have, Anyway?

Consumers still have a lot of savings. A simple back-of-the-envelope calculation estimates the excess savings in the trillions. From March 2020 to June 2022, the Bureau of Economic Analysis reports that personal income has exceeded personal spending by a cumulative \$5.5 trillion. At the pre-pandemic savings rate of 7.3%, consumers would have saved about \$3.2 trillion, but, in fact, they have an additional hoard of around \$2.3 trillion.

It was not just stimulus savings that led to the hoarding of savings—pandemic inactivity contributed as well. In the same report, consumers saved some 8.2% of disposable personal income, even excluding extraordinary transfers—\$357 billion above the pre-pandemic savings rate.


Consumers finally began to reduce their excess savings in 2022, albeit slowly. In July, according to the BEA's most recent month's personal income and outlays report, they spent \$36 billion above usual outlays. At that rate, it would take more than five years for consumers to spend down their accumulated pandemic savings.

This doesn't mean that we expect consumer strength for the next five years—the calculations are too simplistic. There are several factors working against this outcome, including inflation and the possibility of higher long-run savings rates. A slightly more detailed approach of forecasting personal income and spending could shed better light on expected consumer behavior.

Another View: Forecasting Personal Income and Outlays


The above calculations make the simplifying assumption that savings will increase by a level amount. In fact, both personal income and outlays tend to grow by compounding over time. Historically, both personal income and outlays have grown by an average of 0.4% per month. Since March 2021, growth rates have diverged, likely due to price inflation of necessary goods (food, energy, shelter), with personal income growing by 0.6% monthly and personal spending growing by 0.9%. With spending growing so much more rapidly than income, excess savings may be spent down quite quickly. Looking at the chart below, projecting these growth rates going forward yields a relatively rapid drawdown in excess savings, with excess savings running out by the end of 2023.

Personal Income & Outlays



Source: BEA, Haver, MIM

Excess Monthly Savings



Source: BEA, Haver, MIM


This is still a notional exercise rather than a formal forecast and may still be somewhat optimistic in terms of recession timing.

First, outlays have historically never exceeded disposable income; we would expect outlays to decelerate as it approached personal income.

Second, the current gap between income and spending would likely narrow as the Fed gains control over inflation, reducing the rate of nominal spending.

Third, consumers could be inclined toward higher savings rates going forward. Savings as a share of disposable personal income tends to rise following run-of-the-mill recessions, perhaps as households are (temporarily) scared into fiscal prudence. Following the 2008 financial crisis, savings rates rose substantially from a pre-crisis low of 2.1% to rates generally above 6%.¹ If consumers look to retain higher savings balances, spending could fall off sooner.

These points indicate that a consumption slowdown is likely before 2024, despite the large savings stash.



Source: BEA, Haver, MIM

Distributional Effects Cut Both Ways

Finally, there are distributional concerns. If most of these excess savings are concentrated among the wealthy, spending would likely decelerate more rapidly as the lower- and middle-income households run out of excess savings sooner than the aggregate numbers would indicate.

However, we believe that these excess savings are spread relatively broadly. The broad middle-income population—which I define as people with bank accounts who have moderate- to no-liquidity concerns and tight-to-mild budget concerns—includes everyone who has some emergency funds available to those just below the wealthy.

Although this is a heterogenous group, we have two pieces of evidence that this group remains somewhat flush. First, aggregate household checking and currency holdings have skyrocketed since the pandemic, from \$3.4 trillion pre-pandemic to \$7.8 trillion by the end of Q1 2022.² This is unlikely to be driven solely by a small cohort of wealthy individuals; instead, it is more likely to be driven by a large number of households who now have a bit more liquidity in their bank accounts.³ Second, a recent study has shown that individuals with an average of \$500 in their bank accounts now have an average of \$4,500 in the bank, and those with \$3,500 in the bank now have an average of \$13,000 in the bank.⁴

The lack of hard data on the distributional features of the excess savings means that we cannot come to strong conclusions about how rapidly households will spend down their savings going forward. We can, however, suggest that some share of the savings is owned by middle-income households rather than mostly wealthier households and is therefore likely to be spent down over time.

Conclusion

Excess savings of U.S. consumers is so far defying the Fed's efforts to constrain consumer growth via rate hikes. With their massive stash of savings, we expect them to continue to defy the Fed for some time to come. Equally, there are a number of forces that are likely to impede continued spending past the end of 2023. As a result, we continue to expect a recession in 2023 rather than earlier—or later.

Endnotes

¹ Bureau of Economic Analysis

² Financial Accounts of the United States, Federal Reserve Board

³ It is very possible, however, that the lowest income group, those that are more severely liquidity constrained, may already have run out of savings. Aside from anecdotal evidence of economic hardship caused by inflation, there is evidence in the more rapid growth of credit card debt.

⁴ "U.S. consumer: A macro and micro perspective," Erika Najarian, UBS Global Research, Aug 1, 2022.

Author



TANI FUKUI

Director, Global Economic & Market Strategy

About MetLife Investment Management

MetLife Investment Management (MIM)¹ serves institutional investors around the world by combining a client-centric approach with deep and long-established asset class expertise. Focused on managing Public Fixed Income, Private Credit and Real Estate assets, we aim to deliver strong, risk-adjusted returns by building sustainable, tailored portfolio solutions. We listen first, strategize second, and collaborate constantly to meet clients' long-term investment objectives. Leveraging the broader resources and 150-year history of MetLife provides us with deep expertise in skillfully navigating markets. We are institutional, but far from typical.

For more information, visit: investments.metlife.com

Disclaimer

This material is intended solely for Institutional Investors, Qualified Investors and Professional Investors. This analysis is not intended for distribution with Retail Investors.

This document has been prepared by MetLife Investment Management (“MIM”) solely for informational purposes and does not constitute a recommendation regarding any investments or the provision of any investment advice, or constitute or form part of any advertisement of, offer for sale or subscription of, solicitation or invitation of any offer or recommendation to purchase or subscribe for any securities or investment advisory services. The views expressed herein are solely those of MIM and do not necessarily reflect, nor are they necessarily consistent with, the views held by, or the forecasts utilized by, the entities within the MetLife enterprise that provide insurance products, annuities and employee benefit programs. The information and opinions presented or contained in this document are provided as of the date it was written. It should be understood that subsequent developments may materially affect the information contained in this document, which none of MIM, its affiliates, advisors or representatives are under an obligation to update, revise or affirm. It is not MIM’s intention to provide, and you may not rely on this document as providing, a recommendation with respect to any particular investment strategy or investment. Affiliates of MIM may perform services for, solicit business from, hold long or short positions in, or otherwise be interested in the investments (including derivatives) of any company mentioned herein. This document may contain forward-looking statements, as well as predictions, projections and forecasts of the economy or economic trends of the markets, which are not necessarily indicative of the future. Any or all forward-looking statements, as well as those included in any other material discussed at the presentation, may turn out to be wrong.

All investments involve risks including the potential for loss of principle and past performance does not guarantee similar future results.

In the **U.S.** this document is communicated by MetLife Investment Management, LLC (MIM, LLC), a U.S. Securities Exchange Commission registered investment adviser. MIM, LLC is a subsidiary of MetLife, Inc. and part of MetLife Investment Management. Registration with the SEC does not imply a certain level of skill or that the SEC has endorsed the investment advisor.

This document is being distributed by **MetLife Investment Management Limited (“MIML”)**, authorised and regulated by the UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA reference number 623761), registered address 1 Angel Lane, 8th Floor, London, EC4R 3AB, United Kingdom. This document is approved by MIML as a financial promotion for distribution in the UK. This document is only intended for, and may only be distributed to, investors in the UK and EEA who qualify as a “professional client” as defined under the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (2014/65/EU), as implemented in the relevant EEA jurisdiction, and the retained EU law version of the same in the UK.

MIMEL: For investors in the EEA, this document is being distributed by MetLife Investment Management Europe Limited (“MIMEL”), authorised and regulated by the Central Bank of Ireland (registered number: C451684), registered address 20 on Hatch, Lower Hatch Street, Dublin 2, Ireland. This document is approved by MIMEL as marketing communications for the purposes of the EU Directive 2014/65/EU on markets in financial instruments (“MiFID II”). Where MIMEL does not have an applicable cross-border licence, this document is only intended for, and may only be distributed on request to, investors in the EEA who qualify as a “professional client” as defined under MiFID II, as implemented in the relevant EEA jurisdiction.

For investors in the Middle East: This document is directed at and intended for institutional investors (as such term is defined in the various jurisdictions) only. The recipient of this document acknowledges that (1) no regulator or governmental authority in the Gulf Cooperation Council (“GCC”) or the Middle East has reviewed or approved this document or the substance contained within it, (2) this document is not for general circulation in the GCC or the Middle East and is provided on a confidential basis to the addressee only, (3) MetLife Investment Management is not licensed or regulated by any regulatory or governmental authority in the Middle East or the GCC, and (4) this document does not constitute or form part of any investment advice or solicitation of investment products in the GCC or Middle East or in any jurisdiction in which the provision of investment advice or any solicitation would be unlawful under the securities laws of such jurisdiction (and this document is therefore not construed as such).

For investors in Japan: This document is being distributed by MetLife Asset Management Corp. (Japan) (“MAM”), 1-3 Kioicho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 102-0094, Tokyo Garden Terrace KioiCho Kioi Tower 25F, a registered Financial Instruments Business Operator (“FIBO”) under the registration entry Director General of the Kanto Local Finance Bureau (FIBO) No. 2414.

For Investors in Hong Kong S.A.R.: This document is being issued by MetLife Investments Asia Limited (“MIAL”), a part of MIM, and it has not been reviewed by the Securities and Futures Commission of Hong Kong (“SFC”). MIAL is licensed by the Securities and Futures Commission for Type 1 (dealing in securities), Type 4 (advising on securities) and Type 9 (asset management) regulated activities.

For investors in Australia: This information is distributed by MIM LLC and is intended for “wholesale clients” as defined in section 761G of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Act). MIM LLC exempt from the requirement to hold an Australian financial services license under the Act in respect of the financial services it provides to Australian clients. MIM LLC is regulated by the SEC under US law, which is different from Australian law.

¹ MetLife Investment Management (“MIM”) is MetLife, Inc.’s institutional management business and the marketing name for subsidiaries of MetLife that provide investment management services to MetLife’s general account, separate accounts and/or unaffiliated/third party investors, including: Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, MetLife Investment Management, LLC, MetLife Investment Management Limited, MetLife Investments Limited, MetLife Investments Asia Limited, MetLife Latin America Asesorias e Inversiones Limitada, MetLife Asset Management Corp. (Japan), and MIM I LLC and MetLife Investment Management Europe Limited.

L0922025621[exp0924][All States], L0922025611[exp0924][All States], L0922025622[exp0924][All States], L0922025589[exp0924][All States], L0922025635[exp0924][All States]

